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Reconciliation with Residential 
School Survivors:  
A Progress Report1
Jim R. Miller
In August 1986, at Laurentian University in Sudbury, Ontario, Dr. Bob Smith 
led a procession of representatives to his church’s general council out of their 
deliberations to a parking lot where Native delegates to the council awaited them. 
Wearing the alb, the purple stole that symbolizes penitence, Smith, the moderator 
or elected head of the United Church of Canada, expressed the church’s regret 
for its insensitivity towards indigenous people. “We did not hear you when you 
shared your visions. In our zeal to tell you of the good news of Jesus Christ we 
were closed to the value of your spirituality.” The moderator also acknowledged 
that United Church missionaries had “confused Western ways and culture with 
the depth and breadth and length and height of the gospel of Christ,” and had 
“imposed our civilization as a condition for accepting the gospel.” He concluded 
by “ask[ing] you to forgive us and to walk together with us in the Spirit of Christ 
so that our peoples may be blessed and God’s creation healed.”2
The response of the audience to which the apology was directed—First Nations 
delegates to the church’s general council—was revealing. They told the church 
leaders that their “apology was not accepted.” Nevertheless, it was “‘joyfully 
received’ and acknowledged.” The Native delegates erected a stone cairn to 
commemorate the apology, but, “on the advice of the Elders who felt that time 
must be given to see how the church lives out the apology,” it was “left incom-
plete.”3 The message was clear: when non-Native members of the United Church 
lived out the apology their leader had articulated, the commemorative cairn would 
be topped off, and reconciliation would have been achieved within the United 
Church.
The United Church apology was the first of a series of similar statements from 
the churches and church agencies that had been involved in Native residential 
schooling in Canada. In 1991 both the Roman Catholic Church as a national entity 
and the Oblates, a major missionary order, issued apologies. That same year a 
“National Meeting on Indian Residential Schools” attended by sixteen bishops, 
officials from religious organizations, and First Nations Roman Catholics, issued 
a statement referring specifically to the ills of residential schools. Also in 1991, the 
Oblates apologized for “the part we played in the cultural, ethnic, linguistic and 
religious imperialism” that Europeans manifested at contact and later. The Church 
of England in 1993 apologized for efforts “to remake you in our image, taking 
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from you your language and the signs of your identity,” while an accompanying 
statement from the Anglican Primate referred specifically to residential schools as 
a site of offence. The following year the Presbyterian Church in Canada issued 
a lengthy “Confession” that apologized for cooperating with “the stated policy 
of the Government of Canada [that] was to assimilate Aboriginal peoples to the 
dominant culture,” while also making direct reference to residential schools. And, 
finally, the United Church issued another apology in 1998 that referred to “the 
pain and suffering that our church’s involvement in the Indian Residential School 
system has caused.”4
The Canadian churches’ progress in making amends over misguided mission-
ary activity, including residential schools, epitomizes the country’s experience 
dealing with the legacy of abuse that Canada’s residential schools left behind 
when they were phased out in the last three decades of the twentieth century. The 
schools, typical of similar institutions in the United States and New Zealand,5 had 
been instituted in the 1880s as the young Dominion of Canada groped its way 
towards a comprehensive schooling policy for First Nations children.6 Though 
little acknowledged then or since, the new system that the federal government 
announced in 1883 was built on and co-existed with older boarding schools and a 
number of day schools. The government initiative in the 1880s, however, empha-
sized three new industrial schools in the prairie region that were expected to be 
larger, better funded, and more pedagogically ambitious than the existing boarding 
schools. Slowly the system of schools spread through the West, including British 
Columbia from the 1890s onward, and then to the North, northern Ontario, and 
eventually northern Quebec, and one eastern school in Nova Scotia. From 1883 
until 1923 Ottawa recognized both the new “industrial” schools and smaller 
boarding schools, but after forty years of the new policy the differences between 
the two systems had shrunk to insignificance. From 1923 onward the federal 
government spoke simply of residential schools and day schools that it provided 
for Aboriginal—especially First Nations—students. In 1969 the Liberal govern-
ment of Pierre Elliott Trudeau announced that the residential schools would be 
phased out. That process took another quarter-century, and involved the stopgap 
arrangement of Native hostels in some locations, especially in the North, where 
children resided while attending government day schools.
Several factors complicate the history of Native residential schools in Canada 
and largely account for the complex and noxious legacy they left behind. One 
such consideration was that the institutions were run, not as secular schools by the 
federal government itself, but as denominational facilities operated by the mission-
ary arms of four Christian denominations. The largest player in the residential 
school story was a variety of Roman Catholic agencies, the principal among them 
being the male missionary order known as the Oblates of Mary Immaculate, or, 
more simply, the Oblates. The Oblates, Jesuits, Sisters of Saint Anne, Grey Nuns, 
and several other female religious bodies operated approximately 60 percent of 
the residential schools that were authorized by the federal government and run by 
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church bodies. The Roman Catholic Church itself, represented by the hierarchy 
of bishops and archbishops (known formally from the late twentieth century 
as the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops), was not directly involved in 
school operations, although the bishops often served as lobbyists on behalf of 
their missionary brothers and sisters in Ottawa. About one-third of the schools had 
their day-to-day affairs supervised by the Church of England in Canada directly, 
or in one instance by the New England Company. The rest of the schools were 
under the control of the Methodists and Presbyterians. When the Methodists and 
most of the Presbyterians joined with the Congregationalists to form the United 
Church of Canada in 1925, most of the formerly Presbyterian institutions became 
United Church schools, although two continued to be directed by the independent 
Presbyterian Church of Canada.
The shared authority of church and state contributed to the systemic neglect 
that exacerbated the school experience for Native children. The dual leadership 
tended to diffuse oversight and responsibility, and provide a convenient excuse 
when things went wrong. The official approach was that the federal government’s 
Department of Indian Affairs authorized the creation of a residential school, deter-
mined the maximum enrolment for which it would pay financial support, approved 
churches’ nominations of principals and other staff, and inspected the schools to 
ensure they were observing the approved curriculum and looking after the children 
adequately. According to this official view, the churches recruited and nominated 
staff, supplemented government funds (which were never sufficient) with their 
own contributions, and provided day-to-day operation of the schools. The reality 
was depressingly different. Churches lobbied to get new schools approved and 
deficient schools maintained on the approved list. In effect, they selected their own 
academic and child care staffs because government rarely disallowed a church’s 
suggestions. The result was that the missionary bodies were permitted to staff the 
classrooms with individuals who often did not have adequate—or, sometimes, 
any —pedagogical training. The most common rationale for this practice was that 
“a missionary spirit” was more important than a teachers’ college certificate. The 
unstated additional reason was that those with “a missionary spirit” were prepared 
to work for lower wages than academically trained and approved teachers were. 
Finally, the Department of Indian Affairs’ oversight duty was not adequately 
discharged, with the result that performance in both classroom instruction and 
child care was often substandard. In a regime of shared responsibility, sometimes 
no one was properly in charge and responsible.
The other major complication with the schools’ administrative set-up was that 
the separation of principal funding and operating responsibilities invited system-
atic underfunding and resulting negligence. Very soon after a formal system of 
custodial schools was established in the 1880s, the federal government became 
disillusioned with the institutions. It quickly became clear that the schools were 
not producing the results desired, that they were far more costly than anticipated, 
and that neither Native nor non-Native communities were well-disposed towards 
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them. From the government’s point of view, the fact that those who completed 
their studies at residential schools had great difficulty securing employment in 
the mainstream economy was particularly damning. The government responded 
to these disappointments in two ways, one of which had ominous implications 
for residential school students. In 1892 the Department of Indian Affairs initiated 
a long history of limiting government funding of the schools by shifting funding 
from an accountable costs basis to a per capita subsidy arrangement. A combi-
nation of per capita grants and government-controlled pupilage, the officially 
approved maximum enrolment, meant that Ottawa had powerful instruments to 
limit spending on schools. It employed those instruments to hold down its share of 
costs, and in times of difficulty, such as the World Wars and the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, the government could easily cut financial obligations by reducing 
the per capita grant. In times of inflation the government could similarly resist 
increasing the grant. The financial framework within which the schools operated 
guaranteed that there would be negative consequences that fell directly on the 
students. The per capita system was eliminated in the late 1950s.
When per capita grants from the Department of Indian Affairs declined in 
real terms, the missionary organizations that operated the residential schools had 
only a few choices. One avenue for seeking relief was to raise more voluntary 
contributions from the churches of which they were a part. Over time, particu-
larly in the twentieth century, enthusiasm for the missions and schools within 
Canada declined. Another option, one that churches could and did implement, was 
to increase the “subsidy” that students provided by extracting more labour from 
them to keep the school running and to raise funds through the sale of school-
produced goods, principally agricultural products. Taking this route, however, 
courted the danger of impairing the students’ opportunities to learn their academic 
subjects and of creating a regime that wore on them physically. Another response 
that churches employed, particularly prior to the Great War, was to admit students 
whose health should have precluded them from attendance in order to keep student 
numbers up to the pupilage, or maximum approved enrolment. With the conniv-
ance of cooperative doctors and the willful blindness of government inspectors, 
tubercular students were admitted to the schools, with resulting health dangers 
for all. This course of action, regrettable as it was, was frequently taken. Finally, 
another institutional response was to reduce the amount of paid labour in the 
schools, especially in periods—such as the era of the Korean War (early 1950s)—
when inflation and heavy demand for workers made it hard to recruit missionary 
workers anyway. This response reduced the burden of operating expenses that the 
missionary bodies bore, but it exposed students to grave dangers.
The combination of reductions in paid help and lax governmental oversight 
created an environment in which neglect and abuse flourished. It is these condi-
tions that largely account for well-documented problems with student diet, 
deficient health care, poor clothing, and usually nonexistent recreational facilities. 
In such a setting it was all too easy for teachers and dormitory supervisors, often 
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badly overworked themselves, to use severe corporal punishment on the students. 
When excessive discipline was combined, as it unfortunately all too often was, 
with evangelical messages that denigrated Aboriginal spirituality and identity, the 
result was young people whose identity, sense of self worth, and confidence were 
devastated. Finally, as is notorious, the schools also became host to a number of 
sexual predators who exploited their authority and the government and churches’ 
lax oversight to indulge their appetites. While a considerable portion of the sexual 
abuse for which Canada’s residential schools are now infamous was inflicted on 
students by older students, in all cases of such abuse the schools and their staffs 
bore responsibility. If the missionary organizations and government were not 
culpable for failing to screen staff carefully to eliminate such miscreants, they 
and their agents in the schools were liable for not providing adequate supervision 
that would have reduced the amount of student-on-student abuse as well. It is the 
problems of physical and sexual abuse in residential schools that have belatedly 
led to a governmental attempt at reconciliation.
For a number of easily understood reasons it took a long time for victims of 
residential school abuse to disclose what had happened to them. Some former 
students have explained that they could not tell their parents about sexual abuse 
in particular because sexual matters were never discussed in their homes. Conver-
sation about such matters was not considered decent. Others have said that they 
feared to report what missionary workers had done because those school officials 
were viewed as “holy” people by members of their community. Victims of physical 
abuse could and did, however, talk about their suffering, often with quick and 
decisive reaction from their community. A recurring pattern in the history of some 
individual schools was an initial positive response when a school was created, 
followed within a few years by resistance—mainly in the form of official protests 
and attempts to withhold their children—once the syndrome of overwork and 
physical mistreatment became known. Most First Nations were not opposed to 
schooling as such, but they were strongly against abusive pedagogy that victim-
ized their children. Former students and their families protested physical mistreat-
ment when and where they could, but sexual abuse remained for a long time a 
secret confined to the ranks of former students. As Phil Fontaine, at the time head 
of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, explained in 1990, when a group of former 
students got together to talk about their school experiences, “we end up joking and 
laughing about what we experienced. I think that’s essentially a way of avoiding a 
sense of embarrassment and shame one feels. It’s safe, face-saving; and it’s really 
a form of protection.”7
The conversation in which Chief Fontaine made those comments was part of a 
series of events in 1990 that blew the residential school abuse scandal—and many 
other results of government Indian policy—wide open. In the summer of that 
year a seventy-seven-day standoff between Mohawk and first provincial police, 
and later Canadian armed forces, at Oka, Quebec, cast a pitiless spotlight on the 
Canadian government’s handling of relations with First Nations. The Oka Crisis, 
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as it became known, simultaneously threw the Conservative government of Brian 
Mulroney on the defensive and galvanized First Nations across the country to take 
united action to protest what was happening at Oka and demand better treatment. 
The federal government responded with gestures of appeasement, such as easing 
restrictions on its land claims adjudication process, and also by promising to 
create a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) to investigate federal 
policies and their impact. Chief Fontaine’s individual response was to meet with 
Christian church leaders in Winnipeg to disclose to them that he had been a victim 
of physical and sexual abuse at a Roman Catholic school in Manitoba, and to ask 
them to agree to a public inquiry into residential school abuse. As well, in the 
attendant publicity he revealed to a national television audience the same facts.
Fontaine’s disclosure guaranteed that residential school abuse would be one of 
the topics that the RCAP tackled between 1992 and 1996, but the wide-ranging 
nature of its mandate ensured that residential schooling and its problems would 
receive less coverage than many felt it should given the serious problems associ-
ated with the schools. As newspaper reports at the time indicated, during several 
of the community hearings that the commissioners held, former students came 
forward to testify that they had been abused by having their identity and beliefs 
ridiculed, by physical mistreatment, and sometimes by sexual abuse. The commis-
sion’s Final Report included a lengthy, hard-hitting chapter on residential schools 
that highlighted the federal government’s failure to provide the oversight and 
funding that would have ensured that students were properly treated, and recom-
mended that “the government of Canada establish a public inquiry.”8  When the 
federal government eventually responded to the RCAP Final Report in January 
1998 with Gathering Strength: Canada’s Aboriginal Action Plan, it included a 
Statement of Reconciliation. At a press conference to release Gathering Strength, 
Indian Affairs Minister Jane Stewart spoke directly to victims of residential school 
abuse: “We wish to emphasize that what you experienced was not your fault and 
should never have happened. To those of you who suffered this tragedy at resi-
dential schools, we are deeply sorry.” She also announced the creation of a $350-
million Aboriginal Healing Foundation. There was, however, no mention at all of 
a public inquiry into residential schools, the policies that had underlain them, or 
the consequences of those policies.9
Following the 1998 Statement of Reconciliation the trickle of litigation over 
abuse in the schools turned into a flood. Former students launched civil suits for 
damages in large numbers, alleging that they had been the victims of physical and 
sexual abuse, general neglect, and loss of culture and language. This litigation 
would amount to some 13,400 individual suits by March 2005, and several legal 
firms also initiated a series of class actions purporting to speak for all students 
who had attended a specific school or, in one case, for all former residential school 
students. The largest of these class actions, known as the Baxter National Class 
Action, involved nineteen legal firms claiming to represent 90,000 survivors 
across Canada and seeking twelve billion dollars. The class actions and individual 
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suits combined to put enormous pressure on both the churches and the federal 
government.
The strain on the churches manifested itself in various parts of the denomina-
tions’ structures. One common result was an enormous increase in the demands 
for access to the churches’ and religious orders’ archives, as litigating lawyers 
and their research assistants sought documentation to support their claims. For 
the denominations the financial burden of enhanced archival services and legal 
fees also caused serious problems. By 2005 one Anglican diocese in British 
Columbia declared bankruptcy and another in Saskatchewan reported itself on 
the brink of insolvency. Roman Catholics presented a unique case because of 
their church structure. The national governing body, the Canadian Conference 
of Catholic Bishops, pointed out that it and its predecessors had not run any resi-
dential schools, and referred potential litigants to religious orders such as the 
Oblates. The Oblates in turn found themselves extremely hard-pressed, especially 
in their western interior province, which had been the location of a large number 
of schools. Even more serious, of course, were the pains of conscience that church 
adherents from coast to coast felt.
The federal government’s response went through several stages. Initially, the 
Government of Canada fought the legal actions by “third-partying” (i.e., cross-
suing) the churches that had operated the schools. That phase, which consumed 
several years, culminated in court rulings that found both government and 
churches liable for damages, roughly in a ratio of seventy to thirty (government 
to churches). Two high-profile criminal prosecutions of abusers at the Gordon 
Residential School in Saskatchewan and the Alberni Residential School in British 
Columbia paved the way for settlement of claims with individuals from the two 
schools in which the convicted predators had worked. In cases where criminal 
convictions were secured the government paid out compensation to claimants 
fairly quickly, dealing with each survivor on a case-by-case basis.
Ottawa’s response entered a new phase in 2001, when the government estab-
lished a new department, Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada (IRSRC). 
Initially, the new agency carried on with litigation business as usual, but in 2003 
it introduced a dispute resolution (DR) program intended to reduce the burden on 
the courts by resolving some of the pending cases by adjudication. The DR model 
proved enormously complicated and politically unsuccessful. Under this model, 
claimants who were alleging physical abuse, sexual abuse, and/or wrongful 
confinement could enter a voluntary process that was less formal than court proce-
dures. One of the two categories within DR, Model A, was designed to deal with 
sexual abuse and with physical abuse that resulted in injuries lasting more than six 
weeks. Model B was for more minor cases of physical abuse, as well as wrongful 
confinement. Claims under DR that were upheld would result in payments of 70 
percent of the amount awarded by the government, leaving the claimant to seek 
the other 30 percent from the church body involved. (Students from a minority of 
schools—any Anglican- or Presbyterian-run institution, the Oblate Lejac Indian 
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Residential School in northern British Columbia, or the boys’ or girls’ Catholic 
schools at Spanish, Ontario—who were successful would receive 100 percent of 
their award from the government under specially negotiated agreements.)
For a variety of reasons this mechanism never proved acceptable to Aboriginal 
people, or efficient for government and churches. Claimants under DR faced a 
number of hurdles. They could claim only for physical and sexual abuse, and 
at first had to waive any future right to litigate separately for cultural loss.10 The 
application form for the process was a daunting thirty-eight pages in length. 
Offensive to many were the guidelines that adjudicators were required to use in 
determining the amount of awards. Physical abuse that left a scar was worth ten 
points and repeated rape earned fifty points, and so on. Although criticized by 
some as a crude “meat chart,” the guidelines were more complicated and sensitive 
than that term implied. Adjudicators assessed awards based not just on the severity 
of the abuse but also on their judgment of the psychological impact the abuse had 
had. Nonetheless, thanks in part to media coverage, perception trumped reality. 
The DR scheme was expected to deal with only 15 percent of claimants and cost 
$1.7 billion, with more going to administrators and adjudicators than to successful 
claimants. Finally, in recognition that the courts in different regions of the country 
had handled awards for damages differently, the DR program set different caps 
on settlements for various regions of the country. Successful claimants under DR 
in British Columbia, Ontario, and Yukon would receive up to $245,000, but in all 
other jurisdictions the maximum was $195,000. These various challenges resulted 
in the DR process being cumbersome, slow moving, and politically controver-
sial.
By 2004 the government, churches, Aboriginal political organizations, and 
leading lawyers involved in litigation began negotiating a proposed “blanket settle-
ment” potentially for all former students, which became a major component of the 
Kelowna Accord that was signed in November 2005.11 Although the Kelowna 
Accord was repudiated by the Conservative Harper government after its electoral 
victory in early 2006, the lengthening history of failed attempts at dealing with 
abuse claims and the advancing class action suits provided stimulus to seek a 
new, comprehensive settlement that would be more viable than the programs the 
government had developed on its own. The Harper government appointed retired 
Supreme Court of Canada justice Frank Iacobucci to negotiate a pact with the 
federal government, legal representatives of former students, and lawyers for the 
churches.12
The settlement reached in May 2006 was more wide-ranging and oriented 
towards reconciliation than any of the previous attempts at dealing with the legacy 
of residential schools. The most comprehensive element was a Common Experi-
ence Payment (CEP) through which all former students who could prove their 
attendance would receive ten thousand dollars plus three thousand dollars for each 
year of residence after the first year. First Nations leader Phil Fontaine of the AFN 
maintained that this universal provision contained compensation for cultural loss, 
APR Volume 7.indb   140 1/13/10   12:13:51 PM
 
This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.
  /  Reconciliation with Residential School Survivors  /  11
even though the government did not want to negotiate that specifically and did 
not acknowledge it in the agreement.13 In addition, those who experienced sexual 
or “serious physical abuse” could avail themselves of an Independent Assessment 
Process (IAP)—an enhanced, but largely unchanged, version of the dispute reso-
lution system that would deal with their claims over the next five years. In this 
process, “compensation through the IAP will be paid at 100% by the Government 
in all cases, following validation of the claim by an independent adjudicator.” The 
settlement agreement had to be approved by courts in various regions of Canada, 
with an opt-out period of five months following court approval, and “since fewer 
than 5,000 eligible former students opted-out, the Settlement Agreement came 
into effect on September 19, 2007.”14 
The government had made interim payments to all former students sixty-five 
or older, with 10,333 of 11,646 claimants receiving an advance payment of eight 
thousand dollars under this provision.15 After more controversy about a compli-
cated and lengthy application form, applications to the Common Experience 
Payment program were accepted from September 19, 2007 on. As of February 
2, 2009, 97,371 applications had been received, 92,408 processed (3,036 were 
reported “in progress,” and another 1,927 required “further information to 
complete”), 72,274 payments were issued, and 20,134 applications were rejected 
as ineligible.16 The average payout under the Common Experience Payment was 
expected to be approximately twenty-nine thousand dollars.
In many ways the non-monetary provisions (or at least expenditures not 
involving former students directly) were more interesting and more promising 
than the Common Experience Payments and the Independent Assessment Process. 
These other elements included a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, $20 
million for “Commemoration” projects, and “an additional endowment of $125 
million to the Aboriginal Healing Foundation.” The agreement also specified that 
“the Church entities involved in the administration of Indian Residential Schools 
will contribute up to a total of $100 million in cash and services toward healing 
initiatives.”17 Several of the churches had long since established programs to 
assist with healing. Aboriginal leaders also requested that the federal govern-
ment make a full and formal apology for the residential schools. When the Harper 
government initially signalled that it would not make an apology, it came under 
pressure in the House of Commons. After the Commons voted 257–0 to apologize 
to former residential school students, the Indian Affairs minister backtracked 
somewhat by saying that the government was not committing itself to make an 
apology until the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had completed its work. 
Pressure continued, however, and the Harper government yielded. The autumn 
2007 Speech from the Throne announced that the government would make an 
apology to residential school survivors.18
During 2008, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) attracted a great 
deal of attention. According to the settlement agreement, the TRC had a budget 
of sixty million dollars for a five-year mandate “to promote public education and 
APR Volume 7.indb   141 1/13/10   12:13:51 PM
 
This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.
12  /  Part Two: From History to Policy
awareness about the Indian Residential School system and its legacy, as well as 
provide former students, their families and communities an opportunity to share 
their Indian Residential School experiences in a safe and culturally appropriate 
environment.”19 The commission, to be composed of three commissioners and 
support staff, would concentrate on two areas: “Over the course of its five year 
mandate, the TRC will prepare a comprehensive historical record on the policies 
and operations of the schools,” and leave as its legacy a “research centre … that 
will be a permanent resource for all Canadians on the Indian Residential School.” 
As well, the TRC would provide a platform for former students and others 
involved in residential schools to describe their experiences: “The Commission 
will host seven national events in different regions across Canada to promote 
awareness and public education about the Indian Residential School system and 
its impacts.” It would also arrange for people who appeared before it to speak to a 
commissioner in private if they so chose. The commission would “be an opportu-
nity for people to tell their stories about a significant part of Canadian history, still 
unknown to most Canadians.”20
The initial appointments to the commission promised a sensitive reception 
for informants who chose to appear before it. In late April 2008 Judge Harry 
LaForme of the Ontario Court of Appeal was announced as the chief commis-
sioner, and in mid-May Jane Morley, a lawyer who served as an adjudicator under 
the earlier reconciliation process, and Claudette Dumont-Smith, a nurse with 
extensive experience in Aboriginal health matters, joined him to complete the trio 
of commissioners.21 Chief Commissioner LaForme insisted that the aim was not 
to assign blame, but to create a place for healing and public education. “I believe,” 
he said, “that if the commission does its work reliably, being faithful to its objec-
tives, we will come out of the Indian residential-school experience enhanced and 
stronger.”22 The commission initially was expected to begin its public hearings 
in the autumn of 2008 and complete them within two years. Other tasks, such as 
compiling a history and supporting commemoration events, were to be spread 
over the remainder of the TRC’s mandate. The Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion officially began work on June 1. Delays that were unexplained at first led to 
an announcement that the first national event the commission would hold would 
take place early in 2009.
The cause of the revision of plans became clear on October 20 when Chief 
Commissioner Harry LaForme resigned, citing irreconcilable differences between 
he and the other two commissioners. He alleged that they refused to accept his 
authority as chief commissioner, and expected the commission to run by majority 
vote. As well, he claimed that he was more interested in reconciliation, while his 
former commissioners were more focused on a search for the truth.23 The other two 
commissioners denied that they were more interested in truth than reconciliation, 
said they expected the commission to operate collegially, and were surprised that 
LaForme had resigned because they had been under the impression that they were 
conducting their business reasonably well. A source close to Laforme said that the 
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former chief commissioner believed there was interference from the Assembly of 
First Nations, prompting a response from AFN National Chief Phil Fontaine that 
the parties to the settlement agreement that had established the TRC had never 
envisaged a commission that would operate in a hierarchical manner. On the latter 
point he was supported by a spokesman for the United Church of Canada, also 
party to the settlement.24 On October 29, lawyers for the parties to the settlement 
met with the two judges who supervised implementation of the settlement, and 
agreed to meet again during the first week of November.25 Meetings continued 
over the winter of 2008–09, but at time of writing it is not clear what the short-
term future of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established amidst such 
hopes and expectations, will be.26
A more promising development in 2008 was Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 
apology for residential schools in the House of Commons on June 11, 2008. The 
government’s statement was comprehensive, specifying the types of abuse that 
had occurred, and stressed the government’s culpability for the damage done. 
All three opposition party leaders also spoke on the occasion, with Liberal leader 
Stéphane Dion making the point that the Liberals, who had formed government 
for seventy years of the twentieth century, recognized their responsibility and 
acknowledged shared culpability for what had occurred. Representatives of the 
First Nations, Métis, Inuit, and non-status Indian political organizations, as well 
as the president of the Native Women’s Association of Canada, were positive in 
their responses in the Chamber, emphasizing their appreciation of the apology 
and focusing on the future.27 In general, Canadians showed a surprising degree of 
awareness and approval of the government’s apology.28 A public opinion survey 
conducted by Innovative Research Group in the June 11–13 period revealed that 
83 percent of respondents were aware of the apology, and of those 71 percent 
believed that the government should apologize.29 In the short term, at least, the 
residential school apology seemed to have contributed to the cause of reconcili-
ation.
There have been encouraging signs that effective healing is beginning. One indi-
cation is found in the experience of the United Church of Canada, the first of the 
country’s Christian denominations that began to make amends for its mistreat-
ment of First Nations. Church leaders had apologized to Native peoples in 1986 
for misguided missionary activities in general, and more specifically in 1998 for 
the damage that Methodist, Presbyterian, and then United Church schools had 
done. The United Church was proud of some of the steps it had taken to heal 
the damage. It had created an All Native Circle Conference for Native congrega-
tions, established its own healing fund, begun to explore the integration of indig-
enous and Christian liturgy and symbols through a “Circle and Cross” process, 
and taken an active role in the talks among government and various churches on 
how to respond to Native leaders’ demands.30 In August 2005 First Nations United 
Church representatives assembled again in the same parking lot at Laurentian 
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University in Sudbury where they had heard the initial apology in 1986. Then they 
had responded, not with a declaration that they accepted the apology, but with 
an expression of “joyful” receipt of the gesture. A new moderator, the Rev. Dr. 
Peter Short, offered the church’s apology again nineteen years later. In response 
“the various presbyteries and individuals each placed a stone on the cairn and 
explained why they were adding their stone.” It was because their elders had 
deliberated and concluded that the United Church had made meaningful efforts 
to bring about reconciliation. As Moderator Short recalled the occasion, “several 
stones (‘grandfathers’) were mortared into place as a sign of significant steps that 
had been taken.”31
Over the past two decades Canadians have travelled some distance along the 
road of reconciliation in an effort, belated perhaps, but an attempt all the same, 
to make amends for the damage inflicted by the residential schools that Euro-
Canadians imposed on Natives. Like other states such as South Africa, New 
Zealand, and Australia, the North American dominion is trying to advance towards 
meaningful reconciliation with indigenous peoples. If the forward movement 
continues, perhaps a new generation of Native adherents to the United Church of 
Canada will find reason to go to that parking lot in Sudbury and cap off that cairn 
with the last few stones.
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